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In a discrete routing game, each of n selﬁsh users employs a mixed strategy to ship her
(unsplittable) traﬃc over m parallel links. The (expected) latency on a link is determined
by an arbitrary non-decreasing, non-constant and convex latency function φ. In a Nash
equilibrium, each user alone is minimizing her (Expected) Individual Cost, which is the
(expected) latency on the link she chooses. To evaluate Nash equilibria, we formulate Social
Cost as the sum of the users’ (Expected) Individual Costs. The Price of Anarchy is the worst-
case ratio of Social Cost for a Nash equilibrium over the least possible Social Cost. A Nash
equilibrium is pure if each user deterministically chooses a single link; a Nash equilibrium
is fully mixed if each user chooses each link with non-zero probability. We obtain:
For the case of identical users, the Social Cost of any Nash equilibrium is no more than the
Social Cost of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium, which may exist only uniquely. Moreover,
instances admitting a fully mixed Nash equilibrium enjoy an eﬃcient characterization.
For the case of identical users, we derive two upper bounds on the Price of Anarchy: For
the case of identical links with a monomial latency function φ(x) = xd , the Price of Anarchy
is the Bell number of order d + 1. For pure Nash equilibria, a generic upper bound from
the Wardrop model can be transfered to discrete routing games. For polynomial latency
functions with non-negative coeﬃcients and degree d, this yields an upper bound of d+ 1.
For the case of identical users, a pure Nash equilibrium (and thereby an optimum pure
assignment) can be computed in time O (m logm logn). For the general case, computing
the best or the worst pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete, even for identical links with
an identity latency function.
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1.1. Background
Nash equilibrium [39,40] is one of the most signiﬁcant concepts in Non-Cooperative Game Theory. For a given strategic
game, a Nash equilibrium is a state where no player can improve her individual objective by unilaterally changing its
strategy. A Nash equilibrium is called pure if each player chooses exactly one strategy; it is called mixed if each player makes
her choice using a probability distribution over strategies. In a fully mixed Nash equilibrium [36], each player chooses each
strategy with non-zero probability. The Price of Anarchy [31,41] is the worst-case ratio of the Social Cost in a Nash equilibrium
and the least possible Social Cost.
Much of the recent algorithmic work on Non-Cooperative Game Theory considered selﬁsh routing, where it focused on
the KP model due to Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [31] and the Wardrop model [48]. The KP model was proposed only
recently in the context of studying the effects of selﬁsh traﬃc over the Internet; in contrast, the Wardrop model dates back
to the 1950s, when it was used for studying the economics of transportation networks (see, e.g., [4,5,12]).
– In the KP model, each of n selﬁsh users employs a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over m parallel links,
to ship its (unsplittable) traﬃc; so, the traﬃc of each user is shipped all together and with no splitting. The (expected)
latency on a link is linear in the (expected) total traﬃc of users choosing it. The (Expected) Individual Cost of a user is the
(expected) latency on the link it chooses. In a Nash equilibrium, each user alone is minimizing its Expected Individual
Cost. The Social Cost is the (expected) maximum latency; the Optimum is the least possible maximum latency.
– In the Wardrop model, the network can be arbitrary. Modeled as a network ﬂow from source to destination, selﬁsh traﬃc
is inﬁnitesimally splittable; this modeling rules out mixed strategies from consideration. Associated with each link is a
convex latency function, which determines the latency on the link for a given traﬃc. In a Wardrop equilibrium [48], all
used paths incur the same (total) latency. So, a Wardrop equilibrium can be interpreted as a Nash equilibrium for a
strategic game with inﬁnitely many users, each carrying an inﬁnitesimal amount of traﬃc. The Individual Cost of each
such user is the sum of link latencies on the path it chooses; the Social Cost is the integral of the Individual Costs; so, it
is the overall cost incurred to the users.
1.2. Discrete routing games
In this work, we introduce the model of discrete routing games as a hybridization of the KP model and the Wardrop
model.
We follow the KP model to consider the parallel links network with m links and n users with unsplittable traﬃcs and
mixed strategies. However, we allow arbitrary non-decreasing, non-constant and convex latency functions, whereas latency
functions for the KP model are linear. So, the latency function for a link is a convex function of the total traﬃc of users
choosing the link. The Social Cost is the sum of (Expected) Individual Costs; the (Expected) Individual Cost of a user is the
(expected) latency on the link it chooses. So, as far as the generality of latency functions and the Social Cost are concerned,
discrete routing games lean towards the Wardrop model; however, the network structure and the unsplittability of traﬃcs
come from the KP model.
The assumption of convex latency functions determines a very broad class of discrete routing games. Restricted to mono-
tone latency functions and pure Nash equilibria, discrete routing games were already studied in [10]. Restricted to linear
latency functions, they have been studied by Lücking et al. in [33], where Social Cost was formulated as the sum of weighted
Expected Individual Costs and called Quadratic Social Cost; so, the model in [33] is the special case of discrete routing games
where latency functions are linear and users are identical. To the best of our knowledge, discrete routing games represent
the ﬁrst model to simultaneously consider mixed Nash equilibria and arbitrary (convex) latency functions.
Discrete routing games are a particular instance of weighted congestion games [37,42], where each pure strategy is an
arbitrary (not necessarily singleton) set of links. It is known that all unweighted congestion games admit a pure Nash
equilibrium [42]. Hence, so do discrete routing games in the special case of identical (unweighted) users. However, it is
straightforward to verify through a lexicographic argument (cf. [18, Theorem 1]) that discrete routing games admit a pure
Nash equilibrium in the general case of arbitrary (weighted) users.
1.3. Contribution
Our results for discrete routing games are partitioned into four major groups:
1.3.1. Fully mixed Nash equilibria
Which is the worst-case Nash equilibrium for discrete routing games with respect to Social Cost? This is a very natural
question, which we address for the special case of identical users. As our main result, we prove that for any discrete routing
game with convex latency functions, whenever a fully mixed Nash equilibrium exists, it is a worst-case Nash equilibrium
(Theorem 4.3). Therewith, we prove the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture for discrete routing games (but only for the
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a simple counterexample to show that this assumption is essential (Proposition 4.4).
Furthermore, we prove that a fully mixed Nash equilibrium may exist only uniquely (Theorem 4.6). The proof utilizes the
assumption that the latency functions are non-decreasing and non-constant, but it does not need the convexity assumption
on them.
Finally, we provide a combinatorial characterization of instances admitting a fully mixed Nash equilibrium. Speciﬁcally,
we identify the classes of dead and special links, and we prove some combinatorial properties for them (Lemmas 4.8 and 4.9).
In turn, these properties are used for characterizing instances admitting a fully mixed Nash equilibrium (Theorem 4.10).
Furthermore, we prove a generalization of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture for instances that do not admit a
fully mixed Nash equilibrium (Theorem 4.11).
As our chief combinatorial instrument for the study of fully mixed Nash equilibria in discrete routing games, we introduce
and study a novel combinatorial function, called the binomial function (Section 2).
1.3.2. Price of Anarchy
We focus on the special case of identical users, for which we present two upper bounds on the Price of Anarchy for
mixed and pure Nash equilibria, respectively. We remind the reader that n and m are the numbers of users and links,
respectively.
– We ﬁrst treat mixed Nash equilibria, where we consider the special case of identical links with a monomial (convex)
latency function φ(λ) = λd . We prove that the Price of Anarchy is less than the Bell number of order d+ 1 (Theorem 5.1).
When m = n and in the limit, this bound can be attained arbitrarily close but not exactly.
– For pure Nash equilibria, we consider the case of arbitrary links. We revisit a generic upper bound on the Price of Anar-
chy for the Wardrop model, which was shown by Roughgarden and Tardos [44]. We utilize the assumption that latency
functions are non-decreasing and non-constant to transfer this bound to discrete routing games (Proposition 5.3).
For polynomial latency functions with non-negative coeﬃcients and degree d  1, the transfered bound immediately
yields an upper bound of d + 1 (Corollary 5.4).
Interestingly, both shown upper bounds on the Price of Anarchy are constant—independent of m and n.
1.3.3. Algorithmic results
We present algorithmic results for the case of identical users and arbitrary links. These results utilize the assumption
that latency functions are non-decreasing.
– We show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in O (m logm logn) time (Theorem 6.1). This improves on the
simple approach of assigning users one-by-one to their respective best links which is motivated by Graham’s classi-
cal LPT scheduling algorithm [27] (cf. [18, Section 3]); the approach applies directly to the general case of arbitrary
users, yielding a polynomial time algorithm. The improvement is achieved by an algorithm running in logn phases; in
each phase, user chunks of halving size are switched together to a different link in order to improve their (common)
Individual Cost. We show that the number of such switches per phase is O (m). We use a suitable data structure for
implementing each switch in Θ(logm) time, for a total of O (m logm) time per phase; this implies that the total time
is O (m logm logn).
– Under a certain convexity assumption on the latency functions, we exhibit a very simple, polynomial time reduction
from the problem of computing an optimum (pure) assignment to the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium
(Proposition 6.4). Together with our eﬃcient algorithm for computing a pure Nash equilibrium, this implies a corre-
sponding eﬃcient algorithm to compute an optimum assignment (Corollary 6.5).
1.3.4. Complexity results
We present some complexity results for the problems of computing the best-case and worst-case Nash equilibrium (with
respect to the particular Social Cost adopted for discrete routing games). Speciﬁcally, we prove that in the general case of
arbitrary users, both problems are N P-complete (Theorems 7.1 and 7.3, respectively). Both N P-completeness results hold
even for the case of identical links with an identity latency function.
Both proofs use polynomial time transformations from the N P-complete PARTITION problem [29], whose counting
version is known to be #P-complete [45]. The employed transformations are parsimonious—roughly speaking, they preserve
the number of solutions (cf. [32, Deﬁnition 26.6]). This implies that the problems of counting the best-case and worst-case
pure Nash equilibria are both #P-complete as well (Corollaries 7.2 and 7.4).
4 The validity of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture for the general case of arbitrary users in discrete routing games is left as an open problem.
Apparently, the counterexample for the case of arbitrary users in the KP-model shown in [17] does not apply to discrete routing games where Social Cost
is deﬁned in a different way.
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The KP model has received a lot of interest and attention—see, e.g., [10,11,13–15,18,21,24,25,30,34,36]. For a survey of
early work on the Wardrop model, see [5]. Inspired by the new interest in the Price of Anarchy, Roughgarden and Tardos
[44] initiated recently a reinvestigation of the Wardrop model; for recent results, we refer the reader to the book [43] (and
the references therein).
The fully mixed Nash equilibrium was originally introduced and analyzed by Mavronicolas and Spirakis [36] for the KP
model. For the KP model, it was shown that existence of a fully mixed Nash equilibrium implies its uniqueness [36]. This
result applies to the special case of discrete routing games where latency functions are linear; hence, it is broadened by
Theorem 4.6.
The original Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture for the KP model states that the worst-case Nash equilibrium is the
fully mixed Nash equilibrium for instances where the fully mixed Nash equilibrium exists. This conjecture was originally
motivated by some results in [18]; it was explicitly formulated in [24] and further studied and extended to other related
models in [16,17,22,26,33–35]. In particular, Lücking et al. [33] proved the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture for the
special case of identical users and identical links in their model (which is itself a special case of discrete routing games).
Recently, Fischer and Vöcking [17] provided a counterexample to the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture for the special
case of arbitrary users and identical links in the KP model.
Bounds on the Price of Anarchy for the KP model are given in [11,14,30,31,36]. These include (tight) bounds of Θ( logmlog logm )
for the case of identical links [11,30,31,36] and of Θ( logmlog log logm ) for the case of arbitrary links [11]. Bounds on the Price of
Anarchy for several variants and generalizations of the KP model were proved in [2,3,7,19–21,23,35,47].
Bounds on the Price of Anarchy for congestion games were proved in [1,2,8]. Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [8] consider
congestion games with unweighted players and under linear and polynomial latency functions (of degree d and with non-
negative coeﬃcients); they deﬁne Social Cost as either the maximum (Expected) Individual Cost or the sum of (Expected)
Individual Costs. The upper bounds obtained for their latter deﬁnition apply to discrete routing games as well. In particular,
Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [8] prove that the Price of Anarchy for Social Cost as sum of (Expected) Individual Costs is
Θ(dd(1−o(1))). (Exact values were later obtained in [1] for both cases of unweighted and weighted players.) Corollary 5.4
provides a much smaller upper bound of d + 1 for the special case of discrete routing games where each pure strategy is a
singleton set (but restricted to pure Nash equilibria).
For the KP model, Fotakis et al. [18] showed that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time using
Graham’s LPT scheduling algorithm [27]. This result applies to the special case of discrete routing games where latency
functions are linear; hence, it is broadened by Theorem 6.1.
Fotakis et al. [18] showed that computing the best-case and the worst-case (pure) Nash equilibria are both N P-complete
for the KP model where Social Cost is deﬁned as the (expected) maximum latency; in contrast, Theorems 7.1 and 7.3 apply
to discrete routing games where Social Cost is deﬁned as the sum of (Expected) Individual Costs.
A result of Conitzer and Sandholm [9, Theorem 1] directly implies that it is N P-complete to decide if an arbitrary
strategic game has a (mixed) Nash equilibrium for which the sum of the (Expected) Individual Costs is no more than some
arbitrary number; this holds even if the game is symmetric and has only two players. Theorem 7.1 is comparable to this
result. On one hand, it restricts to a particular kind of strategic games (namely, discrete routing games) and it applies even
to the case with only three links; on the other hand, it assumes an arbitrary number of players. Furthermore, Corollary 7.2
is comparable to [9, Corollary 12], which established the #P-completeness of the corresponding counting problem.
Subsequent to this work, Gairing et al. [22] introduced yet another hybridization of the KP model and the Wardrop
model, where Social Cost is the expectation of the sum (over links) of Latency Costs; each Latency Cost is deﬁned as a
polynomial function of the total traﬃc of users choosing a link. For their model, Gairing et al. [22] established the Fully
Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture for the special case of identical users and identical links; they also proved several upper
bounds on the Price of Anarchy. To do so, Gairing et al. [22] showed further interesting properties of the binomial function.
(In fact, we used one such property, restated here as Lemma 2.3, to simplify some proofs in the preliminary version of this
work.)
1.5. Notation and preliminaries
Throughout, denote for any integer m  1, [m] = {1, . . . ,m}. Denote as 0 and 1 the vectors (of any appropriate dimen-
sion) with all zeros and all ones, respectively. Denote as R+0 and N0 the sets of non-negative real and natural numbers,
respectively. For a function φ : R+0 → R+0 , denote as φ̂ the function deﬁned by φ̂(λ) = φ(λ + 1). For a random variable X
with associated probability distribution P, denote as EP(X) the expectation of X (according to P). For an integer m 2 and
a dimension j ∈ [m], the j-characteristic m-dimensional vector χ j has entry j equal to 1 and all other entries equal to 0.
Some of our analysis will bring into play some special numbers from classical combinatorics. Recall ﬁrst the Bell number of
order d [6], denoted as Bd , which counts the number of partitions of a set with d elements into blocks (non-empty subsets).
It is known that Bd =∑k∈[d] S(d,k), where for each k ∈ [d], S(d,k), the Stirling number of the second kind [46], counts the
number of partitions of a set with d elements into exactly k blocks. For any pair of integers r  1 and k  1, the falling
factorial of r of order k, denoted as rk , is given by rk = r(r − 1) · · · · · (r − (k − 1)), when r  k. Otherwise (k r + 1), rk = 0.
M. Gairing et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 74 (2008) 1199–1225 12031.6. Organization
In Section 2, we introduce the binomial function. Section 3 presents discrete routing games. The fully mixed Nash equi-
librium is studied in Section 4. Section 5 contains the bounds on the Price of Anarchy. Our algorithms for computing pure
Nash equilibria and optimum pure assignments appear in Section 6. Section 7 contains the complexity results for best-case
and worst-case pure Nash equilibria. We conclude, in Section 8, with a discussion of our results and some open problems.
2. The binomial function
For a vector of probabilities p ∈ [0,1]r , denote as p˜ the vector of probabilities with all entries equal to
∑
i∈[r] pi
r . We now
deﬁne a combinatorial function:
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Binomial function). For any integer r, consider a triple of a vector of probabilities p = 〈p1, . . . , pr〉, a vector
w= 〈w1, . . . ,wr〉 ∈ (R+0 )r , and a function φ : R+0 → R+0 . For a subset U ⊆ [r], denote wU =
∑
k∈U wk . The binomial function
BF(p,w, φ) is deﬁned by
BF(p,w, φ) =
∑
U⊆[r]
∏
k∈U
pk
∏
k/∈U
(1− pk) · φ(wU ).
Roughly speaking, the binomial function BF represents the expectation of a function φ of a random variable that fol-
lows some kind of a binomial distribution—hence, its name. Clearly, the binomial function is a symmetric function in the
probabilities p1, . . . , pr and the weights w1, . . . ,wr—for each permutation π on [r] that maps p to π(p) and w to π(w),
BF(π(p),π(w),φ) = BF(p,w, φ). Moreover, the binomial function BF is a continuous function in the probabilities p1, . . . , pr .
Say that the function φ is non-constant on the vector w if φ(mini∈[r] wi) = φ(∑i∈[r] wi). If φ is both non-decreasing and
non-constant on w, then φ(mini∈[r] wi) < φ(
∑
i∈[r] wi). We now prove a signiﬁcant monotonicity property of the binomial
function:
Lemma 2.1 (Monotonicity of binomial function). Assume that φ is a non-decreasing and non-constant function on the vectorw. Then,
BF(p,w, φ) is strictly increasing in each probability pi , where i ∈ [r].
Proof. Since BF is non-decreasing and non-constant, there is some index r′ ∈ [r] and some set U ⊆ [r] \ {r′} such that
φ(wr′ + wU ) > φ(wU ). Assume, without loss of generality, that r′ = r so that U ⊆ [r − 1]. Since BF(p,w, φ) is a symmetric
function in the probabilities pi , where i ∈ [r], it suﬃces to prove that BF(p,w, φ) is strictly increasing in the probability pr .
Clearly,
BF(p,w, φ) =
∑
U⊆[r]
∏
k∈U
pk
∏
k/∈U
(1− pk)φ(wU )
=
∑
U⊆[r−1]
∏
k∈U
pk
∏
k/∈U∪{r}
(1− pk) ·
[
pr · φ(wU + wr) + (1− pr) · φ(wU )
]
=
∑
U⊆[r−1]
∏
k∈U
pk
∏
k/∈U∪{r}
(1− pk) ·
(
φ(wU ) + pr ·
[
φ(wU + wr) − φ(wU )
])
.
Since φ is non-decreasing, φ(wU +wr)−φ(wU ) 0 for all U ⊆ [r−1]. Moreover, by assumption, φ(wU +wr)−φ(wU ) > 0
for some U ⊆ [r − 1]. It follows that BF(p,w, φ) is strictly increasing in pr , as needed. 
A signiﬁcant special case occurs when w is a constant vector with all entries equal to 1. In this case, we abuse notation
to write BF(p, r, φ) for BF(p,w, φ). For this special case, we prove a monotonicity property of the binomial function with
respect to averaging the probabilities:
Lemma 2.2 (Averaging monotonicity of binomial function). Assume that the function φ is convex. Then, BF(p, r, φ) BF(˜p, r, φ).
Proof. Clearly, it suﬃces to prove that BF(p, r, φ) does not decrease when any two arbitrary probabilities in the vector p
are replaced by their average. Since BF(p, r, φ) is symmetric in the probabilities pi , with i ∈ [r], it suﬃces to prove that
BF(p, r, φ) does not decrease when p1 and p2 are replaced by their average p1+p22 . So, consider the vector of probabilities
q= 〈q1, . . . ,qr〉 with q1 = q2 = p1+p2 , and qi = pi for all i ∈ [r] \ [2]. Write2
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∑
U⊆[r]
∏
k∈U
pk
∏
k/∈U
(1− pk) · φ
(|U |)
=
∑
U⊆[r]\[2]
∏
k∈U
pk
∏
k/∈U∪[2]
(1− pk) ·
[
(1− p1)(1− p2)φ
(|U |)
+ (p1(1− p2) + p2(1− p1))φ(|U | + 1)+ p1p2(φ(|U | + 2))]
=
∑
U⊆[r]\[2]
∏
k∈U
pk
∏
k/∈U∪[2]
(1− pk) ·
[
p1p2
(
φ
(|U | + 2)− 2φ(|U | + 1)+ φ(|U |))
+ (p1 + p2)
(
φ
(|U | + 1)− φ(|U |))+ φ(|U |)],
so that also
BF(q, r, φ) =
∑
U⊆[r]\[2]
∏
k∈U
qk
∏
k/∈U∪[2]
(1− qk) ·
[
q1q2
(
φ
(|U | + 2)− 2φ(|U | + 1)+ φ(|U |))
+ (q1 + q2)
(
φ
(|U | + 1)− φ(|U |))+ φ(|U |)].
Since pi = qi for all users i ∈ [r] \ [2], while q1 + q2 = p1 + p2, it follows that
BF(q, r, φ) − BF(p, r, φ)
=
∑
U⊆[r]\[2]
∏
k∈U
pk
∏
k/∈U∪[2]
(1− pk) ·
[
(q1q2 − p1p2)
(
φ
(|U | + 2)− 2φ(|U | + 1)+ φ(|U |))].
Since q1 = q2 is the arithmetic mean of p1 and p2, it holds that q1q2  p1p2. Since the function φ is convex, φ(|U | + 1) −
φ(|U |) φ(|U | + 2) − φ(|U | + 1); rearranging terms yields that φ(|U | + 2) − 2φ(|U | + 1) + φ(|U |) 0. Thus, BF(q, r, φ) −
BF(p, r, φ) 0, as needed. 
Another signiﬁcant special case of the binomial function occurs when not only w is a constant vector with all entries
equal to 1, but also p is a constant vector with all entries equal to p > 0. We shall analyze this special case under the
additional assumption that φ is the monomial function φ(λ) = λd . We will then abuse notation to write BF(p, r,d) for
BF(p,w, λd). Clearly,
BF(p, r,d) =
∑
0kr
(
r
k
)
pk(1− p)r−kkd.
We shall later use a known fact about BF(p, r,d):
Lemma 2.3. (See Gairing et al. [22].) For any integer d 1, BF(p, r,d) =∑k∈[d] S(d,k) · rk · pk.
3. Discrete routing games
We extend deﬁnitions for the KP model to accommodate features from the Wardrop model.
3.1. General
We consider a simple network consisting of m 2 parallel links 1,2, . . . ,m from a source node to a destination node. Each
of n 2 users 1,2, . . . ,n wishes to route a particular amount of (unsplittable) traﬃc along a (non-ﬁxed) link from source to
destination.
Denote as wi > 0 the traﬃc of user i ∈ [n]. Deﬁne the n × 1 traﬃc vector w in the natural way. For a user i ∈ [n],
eliminating wi from the vector w yields the (n − 1)-dimensional vector w−i . Associated with each link j ∈ [m] is a latency
function φ j : R+0 → R+0 , which is a non-decreasing and non-constant function with φ j(0) = 0. For each user i ∈ [n], deﬁne the
function φi j : R+0 → R+0 by φi j(λ) = φ j(wi + λ). We assume that φ1(1)  · · ·  φm(1); call link 1 the smallest link and say
that link j is smaller than link k whenever j < k. Deﬁne the m × 1 latency function vector Φ in the natural way. An instance
is a pair 〈w,Φ〉.
In the case of identical users, all user traﬃcs are 1 and an instance is a pair 〈n,Φ〉. In the case of identical links, φ j = φ
for all links j ∈ [m], where φ is a non-decreasing and non-constant function (with φ(0) = 0); in this case, an instance is a
pair 〈w, 〈m, φ〉〉. For the case of identical users and identical links, an instance is a pair 〈n, 〈m, φ〉〉. In the general case, we
talk about arbitrary users and arbitrary links.
In the case of identical users, each latency function is a discrete function φ j : [n] ∪ {0} → R+0 φ j(0) = 0; clearly, φ̂ j = φi j
for each (identical) user i ∈ [n]. In this case, say that the latency function φ j is non-constant on [n], or non-constant for short,
if φ j(1) = φ j(n); since each φ j is non-decreasing, this implies that φ j(1) < φ j(n).
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For the case of identical users, we will often assume that the latency functions enjoy some property of discrete convexity
on the domain [n] ∪ {0}. Formally, a function φ : [n] ∪ {0} → R+0 is convex if for all pairs of integers x1, x2 ∈ [n − 1] with
x1 < x2, φ(x1 + 1)−φ(x1) φ(x2 + 1)−φ(x2). Clearly, to establish that such a function φ is convex, it suﬃces to prove that
for any x ∈ [n− 1], φ(x)− φ(x− 1) φ(x+ 1)− φ(x). Our deﬁnition of a convex function is the particular, one-dimensional
case of a corresponding deﬁnition of M-convex functions due to Murota [38]:
For B ⊆ Nm0 , a function φ : B → R is called M-convex if for all vectors x,y ∈ B and for all dimensions j ∈ [m] with
x( j) > y( j) there exists a dimension k ∈ [m] with x(k) < y(k) such that x−χ j +χk ∈ B , y+χ j −χk ∈ B , and
φ(x) + φ(y) φ(x−χ j +χk) + φ(y+χ j −χk).
We will later use a combinatorial property of M-convex functions, which was originally shown by Murota [38, Theo-
rem 2.2]:
Proposition 3.1 (Global optimality = local optimality for M-convex). Let φ be an M-convex function on B ⊆ Nm0 . Then, the vector
x ∈ B minimizes φ over B if and only if for all pairs of dimensions j,k ∈ [m], φ(x) φ(x−χ j +χk).
3.3. Strategies and assignments
A pure strategy for user i ∈ [n] is some speciﬁc link. A mixed strategy for user i ∈ [n] is a probability distribution over pure
strategies; so, it is a probability distribution over links.
A pure assignment is a tuple L= 〈1, . . . , n〉 ∈ [m]n; a mixed assignment is an n×m probabilitymatrix P of n ·m probabilities
p(i, j), for all pairs of a user i ∈ [n] and a link j ∈ [m], where p(i, j) is the probability that user i chooses link j; so, for each
user i ∈ [n], ∑ j∈[m] p(i, j) = 1. We will cast a pure assignment as a special case of a mixed assignment in which all (mixed)
strategies are pure. The support of the mixed strategy for user i ∈ [n] in the mixed assignment P, denoted as SupportP(i), is
the set of pure strategies which i chooses with strictly positive probability.
A mixed assignment F is fully mixed [36, Section 2.2] if f (i, j) > 0 for all pairs of a user i ∈ [n] and a link j ∈ [m]. In the
standard fully mixed assignment F, f (i, j) = 1m for all users i ∈ [n] and links j ∈ [m].
Fix now a mixed assignment P. The load δ j(P) on link j ∈ [m] is the total traﬃc of users choosing the link (according
to P); so, δ j(P) is a random variable. For each link j ∈ [m], denote as θ j(P) the expected load on link j ∈ [m]; so, clearly,
θ j(P) =∑k∈[n] p(k, j)wk . Moreover, denote as θi j(P) =∑k∈[n]\{i} p(k, j)wk , the expected load on link j ∈ [m] excluding user
i ∈ [n].
For a user i ∈ [n] and a link j ∈ [m], denote as pi j the (n − 1)-dimensional vector 〈p(1, j), . . . , p(i − 1, j),
p(i+1, j), . . . , p(n, j)〉. The average probability p˜i j on link j excluding user i is deﬁned as p˜i j =
∑
k∈[n]\{i} p(k, j)
n−1 ; clearly, in the
case of identical users, p˜i j = θi j(P)n−1 . It is straightforward to verify that
∑
j∈[m] p˜i j = 1. Denote as p˜i j the (n − 1)-dimensional
vector with all entries equal to p˜i j .
3.4. Costs
3.4.1. Individual Cost and Expected Individual Cost
For the pure assignment L, the Individual Cost for user i ∈ [n], denoted as ICi(L), is
ICi(L) = φi
( ∑
k∈[n]|k=i
wk
)
;
so, the Individual Cost for user i is the latency on the link it chooses.
Fix now a mixed assignment P. The Conditional Expected Individual Cost for user i ∈ [n] on link j ∈ [m], denoted as ICi j(P),
is the expectation (according to P) of the Individual Cost for user i had it chosen link j; thus,
ICi j(P) =
∑
U⊆[n]\{i}
∏
k∈U
p(k, j)
∏
k/∈U∪{i}
(
1− p(k, j)) · φ j(wi + wU ).
Since the latency function φ j is non-decreasing, it follows that for all pairs of a user i ∈ [n] and a link j ∈ [m], ICi j(P) 
φ j(wi).
Using the binomial function, the Conditional Expected Individual Cost is expressed as
ICi j(P) = BF(pi j,w−i, φi j).
For the special case of identical users, this expression reduces to
ICi j(P) = BF(pi j,n − 1, φ̂ j).
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Individual Cost of user i. Thus,
ICi(P) =
∑
j∈[m]
p(i, j) · ICi j(P);
so, Expected Individual Cost is a convex combination of Conditional Expected Individual Costs.
3.4.2. Social cost
Associated with an instance 〈w,Φ〉 and a mixed assignment P is the Social Cost, denoted as SCΣ(w,Φ,P), which is the
sum, over all users, of Expected Individual Costs; so,
SCΣ(w,Φ,P) =
∑
i∈[n]
ICi(P)
=
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
p(i, j)
∑
U⊆[n]\{i}
∏
k∈U
p(k, j)
∏
k/∈U∪{i}
(
1− p(k, j)) · φ j(wi + wU ).
3.4.3. Optimum
Associated with an instance 〈w,Φ〉 is the Optimum, denoted as OPTΣ(w,Φ), which is the least possible, over all pure
assignments, Social Cost; thus,
OPTΣ(w,Φ) = min
L∈[m]n SC
Σ(w,Φ,L).
A pure assignment L is optimum for the instance 〈w,Φ〉 if SCΣ(w,Φ,L) = OPTΣ(w,Φ).
We note two obvious lower bounds on Optimum for the case of identical users and identical links with a monomial
latency function φ(λ) = λd , for some integer d 1. Assuming that nm, OPTΣ(n, 〈m, φ〉) n · ( nm )d; assuming that nm,
OPTΣ(n, 〈m, φ〉) = n.
3.5. Nash equilibria and Price of Anarchy
We are interested in a special class of mixed strategies called Nash equilibria [39,40]. Given an instance 〈w,Φ〉 with an
associated mixed assignment P, a user i ∈ [n] is satisﬁed in P if ICi j(P) = ICi(P) for all links j ∈ SupportP(i), and ICi j(P) 
ICi(P) for all links j /∈ SupportP(i). So, a satisﬁed user has no incentive to unilaterally deviate from its mixed strategy. The
mixed assignment P is a Nash equilibrium if all users i ∈ [n] are satisﬁed in P.
A fully mixed Nash equilibrium [36] is a fully mixed assignment that is a Nash equilibrium. Note that for the case of
identical links, the standard fully mixed assignment F is a (fully mixed) Nash equilibrium since it satisﬁes that for all users
i ∈ [n] and for all pairs of links j, l ∈ [m], ICi j(P) = ICil(P); call it the standard fully mixed Nash equilibrium.
The Price of Anarchy, denoted as PoAΣ , is the worst-case ratio SC
Σ(w,Φ,P)
OPTΣ(w,Φ) , over all instances 〈w,Φ〉 and associated Nash
equilibria P.
A worst-case (or worst for short) Nash equilibrium [31] is one which, on any ﬁxed but arbitrary instance, maximizes
Social Cost. A best-case (or best for short) Nash equilibrium [18] is one which, on any ﬁxed but arbitrary instance, minimizes
Social Cost. The Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture, henceforth abbreviated as the FMNE Conjecture, states that a fully
mixed Nash equilibrium is a worst-case Nash equilibrium.
4. Fully mixed Nash equilibria
We now focus on fully mixed Nash equilibria; we restrict to the special case of identical users. A preliminary property of
fully mixed Nash equilibria is shown in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we formulate and prove the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium
Conjecture under the (essential) assumption of convex latency functions. Furthermore, we establish in Section 4.3 that the
fully mixed Nash equilibrium may only exist uniquely. In Section 4.4, we prove a combinatorial characterization of instances
admitting a fully mixed Nash equilibrium.
4.1. A preliminary property
We show a preliminary property of fully mixed Nash equilibria, which applies to the case of identical users. Speciﬁcally,
we prove that all (identical) users choose each ﬁxed link with the same probability.
Lemma 4.1 (Same probabilities). Consider the case of identical users and arbitrary links with non-constant latency functions. Fix an
instance 〈n,Φ〉 with an associated fully mixed Nash equilibrium F. Then, for all pairs of users i,h ∈ [n] and for all links j ∈ [m],
f (i, j) = f (h, j).
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ICi(F) = ICi j(F)
=
∑
U⊆[n]\{i,h}
∏
k∈U
f (k, j)
∏
k∈[n]\(U∪{i,h})
(
1− f (k, j)) · [(1− f (h, j))φ j(|U | + 1)+ f (h, j)φ j(|U | + 2)]
and also
ICh(F) =
∑
U⊆[n]\{i,h}
∏
k∈U
f (k, j)
∏
k∈[n]\(U∪{i,h})
(
1− f (k, j)) · [(1− f (i, j))φ j(|U | + 1)+ f (i, j)φ j(|U | + 2)].
Hence,
ICi(F) − ICh(F)
=
∑
U⊆[n]\{i,h}
∏
k∈U
f (k, j)
∏
k∈[n]\(U∪{i,h})
(
1− f (k, j)) · ( f (h, j)− f (i, j)) · (φ j(|U | + 2)− φ j(|U | + 1))
= ( f (h, j)− f (i, j)) ∑
U⊆[n]\{i,h}
∏
k∈U
f (k, j)
∏
k∈[n]\(U∪{i,h})
(
1− f (k, j)) · (φ j(|U | + 2)− φ j(|U | + 1)).
Since F is fully mixed,
∏
k∈U f (k, j)
∏
k∈[n]\(U∪{i,h})(1 − f (k, j)) > 0 for all (non-empty) subsets U ⊆ [n] \ {i,h}. Since φ j is
non-decreasing and non-constant on [n], there is a (non-empty) subset U ⊆ [n] \ {i,h} such that φ j(|U | + 2) > φ j(|U | + 1).
These imply that∑
U⊆[n]\{i,h}
∏
k∈U
f (k, j)
∏
k∈[n]\(U∪{i,h})
(
1− f (k, j))(φ j(|U | + 2)− φ j(|U | + 1))> 0.
It follows that ICi(F) > ICh(F) (resp., ICi(F) < ICh(F)) if and only if f (h, j) > f (i, j) (resp., f (h, j) < f (i, j)). Since the link
j ∈ [m] was chosen arbitrarily, this implies that ICi(F) > ICh(F) (resp., ICi(F) < ICh(F)) if and only if for all links l ∈ [m],
f (h, l) > f (i, l) (resp., f (h, l) < f (i, l)). Since, however,
∑
l∈[m] f (h, l) =
∑
l∈[m] f (i, l) = 1, the latter is false. It follows that
ICi(F) = ICh(F). This implies that f (h, j) = f (i, j), as needed. 
Lemma 4.1 implies that a fully mixed Nash equilibrium F can be identiﬁed with a sequence f j ∈ (0,1), j ∈ [m], such that
for all pairs of a user i ∈ [n] and a link j ∈ [m], f (i, j) = f j .
4.2. The FMNE Conjecture
Convex latency functions are considered in Section 4.2.1. Section 4.2.2 considers arbitrary latency functions. Throughout
this section, we keep restricting to the case of identical users.
4.2.1. Convex latency functions
We prove:
Proposition 4.2. Consider the case of identical users and arbitrary links with non-constant and convex latency functions. Fix an
instance 〈n,Φ〉 with an associated fully mixed Nash equilibrium F. Then, for each Nash equilibrium P and for each user i ∈ [n],
ICi(P) ICi(F).
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, there is, for each link j ∈ [m], some probability f j ∈ (0,1) such that each user chooses link j with
probability f j . Denote as f j the (n − 1)-dimensional vector of probabilities with all entries equal to f j .
Since Expected Individual Cost is a convex combination of Conditional Expected Individual Costs, it suﬃces to prove that
for all pairs of a user i ∈ [n] and a link j ∈ SupportP(i), ICi j(P) ICi(F).
Assume, by way of contradiction, that there is a user i ∈ [n] and a link j ∈ SupportP(i) such that ICi j(P) > ICi(F). Then,
ICi j(P) = BF(pi j,n − 1, φ̂ j)
 BF(˜pi j,n − 1, φ̂ j) (by Lemma 2.2).
On the other hand,
ICi(F) = ICi j(F) (since F is a fully mixed Nash equilibrium)
= BF(f j,n − 1, φ̂ j).
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follows from Lemma 2.1 that p˜i j > f j . Clearly,
∑
l∈[m] fl =
∑
l∈[m] f (i, l) = 1. Recall that
∑
l∈[m] p˜il = 1. It follows that there
is a link l ∈ [m] such that p˜il < fl . Thus,
ICi j(P)  ICil(P)
(
since j ∈ SupportP(i) and P is a Nash equilibrium
)
= BF(pil,n − 1, φ̂l)
 BF(˜pil,n − 1, φ̂l) (by Lemma 2.2)
< BF(fl,n − 1, φ̂l)
(
by Lemma 2.1 (since p˜il < fl)
)
= ICil(F)
= ICi(F) (since F is a fully mixed Nash equilibrium)
< ICi j(P) (by assumption),
a contradiction. 
Since Social Cost is the sum of Expected Individual Costs, Proposition 4.2 directly implies:
Theorem 4.3 (Convexity implies the FMNE Conjecture). Consider the case of identical users and arbitrary links with non-constant and
convex latency functions. Then, the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture is valid.
4.2.2. Arbitrary latency functions
We now provide a counterexample to Theorem 4.3. More speciﬁcally, we construct an instance involving identical links
with a non-decreasing and non-constant but not convex latency function for which Proposition 4.2 does not hold. We prove:
Proposition 4.4. Consider the case of identical users and identical links with an arbitrary latency function. Then, there is an instance
〈n, 〈m, φ〉〉 with associated pure Nash equilibrium L and fully mixed Nash equilibrium F such that for all users i ∈ [n], ICi(L) > ICi(F).
Proof. Consider the instance 〈4, 〈2, φ〉〉, where φ : [4] ∪ {0} → R+0 is a (strictly increasing) function with φ(1) = 1, φ(2) = 2,
φ(3) = 136 and φ(4) = 73 . Since φ(3) − φ(2) < φ(2) − φ(1), φ is not convex. Consider any arbitrary pure Nash equilibrium L
and the standard fully mixed Nash equilibrium F, where f (i, j) = 12 for each user i ∈ [4] and link j ∈ [2].
Fix any arbitrary user i ∈ [4]. We compare the Individual Cost ICi(L) and the Expected Individual Cost ICi(F) for user i.
On one hand, note that since φ(2) < φ(3) and φ(1) < φ(4), the deﬁnition of Nash equilibrium implies that in L, there is
no link chosen by either 3 or 4 users. So, exactly two users choose each link in L; hence, ICi(L) = φ(2) = 2. On the other
hand, ICi(F) = 18 (φ(1) + 3φ(2) + 3φ(3) + φ(4)) = 9548 . Since 2> 9548 . It follows that ICi(L) > ICi(F), as needed. 
Since Social Cost is the sum of Expected Individual Costs, Proposition 4.4 directly implies:
Corollary 4.5 (The FMNE Conjecture needs convexity). Consider the case of identical users and identical links with an arbitrary latency
function. Then, the FMNE Conjecture is not valid.
Corollary 4.5 implies that the assumption of convexity made for Theorem 4.3 is essential.
4.3. Uniqueness
We show:
Theorem 4.6 (Fully mixed Nash equilibrium uniqueness). Consider the case of identical users and arbitrary links with non-constant
latency functions. Then, a fully mixed Nash equilibrium may exist only uniquely.
Proof. Assume, by way of contradiction, that there is an instance 〈n,Φ〉 with two distinct associated fully mixed Nash
equilibria F and G. Lemma 4.1 implies that for each link j ∈ [m], there is a probability f j ∈ (0,1) (resp., g j ∈ (0,1)) such
that for all users i ∈ [n], f (i, j) = f j (resp., g(i, j) = g j). For each link j ∈ [m], denote as f j (resp., g j) the (n−1)-dimensional
vector of probabilities with all entries equal to f j (resp., g j).
Since F and G are distinct with
∑
l∈[m] fl =
∑
l∈[m] gl = 1, there are two distinct links j, l ∈ [m] such that f j > g j and
fl < gl . Fix any user i ∈ [n]. Clearly, for the fully mixed Nash equilibria F and G, the Conditional Expected Individual Costs
for user i on the link j ∈ [m] are ICi j(F) = BF(f j,n − 1, φ̂ j) and ICi j(G) = BF(g j,n − 1, φ̂ j). Hence,
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= BF(fl,n − 1, φ̂l)
< BF(gl,n − 1, φ̂l)
(
by Lemma 2.1 (since fl < gl)
)
= ICil(G)
= ICi j(G) (since G is a fully mixed Nash equilibrium)
= BF(g j,n − 1, φ̂ j)
< BF(f j,n − 1, φ̂ j)
(
by Lemma 2.1 (since g j < f j)
)
= ICi j(F),
a contradiction. 
Consider now the case of identical users and identical links, and recall the standard fully mixed Nash equilibrium. Then,
Theorem 4.6 immediately implies:
Corollary 4.7. Consider the case of identical users and identical links. Then, the standard fully mixed assignment is the unique fully
mixed Nash equilibrium.
4.4. Existence
We present a characterization of instances admitting a fully mixed Nash equilibrium. Recall our earlier assumption that
φ1(1) φ2(1) · · · φn(1).
Fix an instance 〈n,Φ〉. For each link k ∈ [m] and for each smaller link j ∈ [k − 1], denote as p j(k) the probability such
that
BF
(
p j(k),n − 1, φ̂ j
)= min{φ j(n),φk(1)},
where p j(k) is the vector with n − 1 entries equal to p j(k). We argue that this deﬁnition uniquely determines a probabil-
ity p j(k). Recall that BF(p j(k),n − 1, φ̂ j) is the Conditional Expected Individual Cost for a user on link j ∈ [m] in the case
where p(i, j) = p j(k) for all remaining users i ∈ [n − 1]. In particular, BF(0,n − 1, φ̂ j) = φ j(1) and BF(1,n − 1, φ̂ j) = φ j(n).
Note that
φ j(1) = min
{
φ j(n),φ j(1)
}
(since φ j is non-decreasing)
 min
{
φ j(n),φk(1)
} (
since φ j(1) φk(1)
)
,
while φ j(n)  min{φ j(n),φk(1)}. So, φ j(1)  min{φ j(n),φk(1)}  φ j(n). By Lemma 2.1, BF(p j(k),n − 1, φ̂ j) is strictly in-
creasing in p j(k). By continuity of the binomial function, this implies that BF attains exactly once the intermediate value
min{φ j(n),φk(1)}. Hence, the deﬁnition uniquely determines a probability p j(k).
We now continue with two important deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Dead and special links).
– A link k ∈ [m] is dead for the instance 〈n,Φ〉 if either (i) φ j(n) < φk(1) for some smaller link j ∈ [k − 1], or (ii)∑
j∈[k−1] p j(k) > 1.
– A link k ∈ [m] is special for the instance 〈n,Φ〉 if ∑ j∈[k−1] p j(k) = 1.
We continue to prove some properties of dead and special links. The ﬁrst of them shows that no user chooses a dead
link.
Lemma 4.8 (No user chooses a dead link). Consider the case of identical users and arbitrary links with non-constant and convex latency
functions. Fix an instance 〈n,Φ〉 with a dead link k ∈ [m] and an associated Nash equilibrium P. Then, p(i,k) = 0 for all users i ∈ [n].
Proof. Assume, by way of contradiction, that there is a user i ∈ [n] such that p(i,k) > 0. Since P is a Nash equilibrium, this
implies that for any link j ∈ [k − 1], ICik(P) ICi j(P). Since φk(1) ICik(P). it follows that φk(1) ICi j(P).
Since k is a dead link, there are two cases to consider. For each case, we will derive a contradiction.
(i) Assume ﬁrst that φl(n) < φk(1) for some smaller l ∈ [k − 1]. Then, by Lemma 2.1,
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 BF(˜pil,n − 1, φ̂l) (by Lemma 2.2)
 BF(1,n − 1, φ̂l)
(
by Lemma 2.1 (since p˜i j  1)
)
= φl(n)
< φk(1) (by assumption),
a contradiction.
(ii) Assume now that
∑
j∈[k−1] p j(k) > 1. Assume that for each smaller link j ∈ [k − 1], φk(1) φ j(n) (since otherwise the
claim follows from the previous case). Note that
∑
j∈[k−1] p˜ j 
∑
j∈[m] p˜ j = 1. It follows that there is some smaller link
l ∈ [k − 1] such that pl(k) > p˜il . Hence,
ICil(P) = BF(pil,n − 1, φ̂l)
 BF(˜pil,n − 1, φ̂l) (by Lemma 2.2)
< BF
(
pl(k),n − 1, φ̂l
) (
by Lemma 2.1
(
since p˜il < pl(k)
))
= min{φl(n),φk(1)} (by deﬁnition of pl(k))
= φk(1),
a contradiction.
Since we derived a contradiction in all possible cases, the proof is now complete. 
We continue to prove:
Lemma 4.9 (At most one user chooses a special link). Consider the case of identical users and arbitrary links with non-constant and
convex latency functions. Fix an instance 〈n,Φ〉 with an associated Nash equilibrium P. Then, there is at most one user i ∈ [n] with
p(i,k) > 0 for some special link k ∈ [m].
Proof. Assume, by way of contradiction, that there are two distinct users i,h ∈ [n] and two (not necessarily distinct) special
links k, r ∈ [m], k r, with p(i,k) > 0 and p(h, r) > 0.
Since p(h, r) > 0, it follows that p˜ir  p(h,r)n−1 > 0. Since k  r m, this implies that
∑
j∈[k−1] p˜i j <
∑
j∈[m] p˜i j = 1. Since
link k is special,
∑
j∈[k−1] p j(k) = 1. It follows that there is some link l ∈ [k − 1] such that pl(k) > p˜il . So,
φk(1)  ICik(P)
 ICil(P)
(
since p(i,k) > 0 and P is a Nash equilibrium
)
= BF(pil,n − 1, φ̂l)
 BF(˜pil,n − 1, φ̂l) (by Lemma 2.2)
< BF
(
pl(k),n − 1, φ̂l
) (
by Lemma 2.1
(
since pil < pl(k)
))
= min{φl(n),φk(1)} (by deﬁnition of pl(k))
 φk(1),
a contradiction. 
We are now ready to prove:
Theorem 4.10 (Existence of fully mixed Nash equilibria). Consider the case of identical users and arbitrary links with non-constant and
convex latency functions. Then, there is a fully mixed Nash equilibrium if and only if there are neither dead nor special links.
Proof. Throughout, ﬁx an instance 〈n,Φ〉.
Assume ﬁrst that 〈n,Φ〉 admits a fully mixed Nash equilibrium F. By deﬁnition, f (i, j) > 0 for all pairs of a user i ∈ [n]
and a link j ∈ [m]. Lemma 4.8 implies that there is no dead link; since n  2, Lemma 4.9 implies that there is no special
link either, and we are done.
Assume now that there are neither dead nor special links for the instance 〈n,Φ〉. We will determine a fully mixed Nash
equilibrium F for 〈n,Φ〉 with f (i, j) = f j for all users i ∈ [n] and links j ∈ [m].
For each link j ∈ [m], deﬁne Δφ j = φ j(n) − φm(1). Clearly, Δφ j  φ j(n). Since there are no dead links, it follows that
Δφ j  0. So, 0Δφ j  φ j(n).
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BF
(
ψ j(x),n − 1, φ̂ j
)= φm(1) + x,
where ψ j(x) is the (n − 1)-dimensional vector with all entries equal to ψ j(x). We argue that ψ j(x) is uniquely determined
by this deﬁnition.
Note that BF(ψ j(x),n − 1, φ̂ j) is the Conditional Expected Individual Cost for a user on link j ∈ [m − 1] in the case
where all remaining users i ∈ [n − 1] choose link j with probability ψ j(x). In particular, BF(0,n − 1, φ̂ j) = φ j(1)  φm(1)
and BF(1,n − 1, φ̂ j) = φ j(n). Note also that
φm(1) + x  φm(1) + Δφ j (since xΔφ j)
= φm(1) + φ j(n) − φm(1)
= φ j(n),
while
φm(1) + x φm(1).
By Lemma 2.1, BF(ψ j(x),n − 1, φ̂ j) is strictly increasing in ψ j(x). By continuity of the binomial function, this implies that
BF attains exactly once the intermediate value φm(1) + x. Hence, the deﬁnition uniquely determines ψ j(x).
Note that the deﬁnition of ψ j(x) and Lemma 2.1 imply together that ψ j(x) is strictly increasing in x ∈ [0,Δφ j], where
j ∈ [m − 1]; in particular, this implies that for any x ∈ (0,Δφ j), 0< ψ j(x) < 1.
Now for the link m, for each x ∈ [0,min j∈[m−1] Δφ j], set
ψm(x) = 1−
∑
j∈[m−1]
ψ j(x).
Clearly, ψm(x) is strictly decreasing in x for x ∈ [0,min j∈[m−1] Δφ j]. Moreover, ψm(x) < 1 for all x ∈ (0,min j∈[m−1] Δφ j].
Deﬁne
x̂ =max
{
x ∈
[
0, min
j∈[m−1]Δφ j
] ∣∣∣ψm(x) 0};
thus, ψm (̂x) = 0.
Consider the function BF(ψm(x),n − 1, φ̂m), where ψm(x) is the (n − 1)-dimensional vector with all entries equal
to ψm(x), for x ∈ [0, x̂]. Since ψm(x) is strictly decreasing in x for x ∈ [0, x̂], Lemma 2.1 implies that BF(ψm(x),n − 1, φ̂m) is
strictly decreasing in x for x ∈ [0, x̂].
Note that by deﬁnition of ψm(x),
ψm(0) = 1−
∑
j∈[m−1]
ψ j(0).
Recall also that for each link j ∈ [m − 1], ψ j(0) is (uniquely) determined by the equation
BF
(
ψ j(0),n − 1, φ̂ j
)= φm(1).
Since there are no dead links, this equation is equivalent to
BF
(
ψ j(0),n − 1, φ̂ j
)=min{φ j(n),φm(1)}.
By deﬁnition of p j(m), it follows that ψ j(0) = p j(m). Hence,
ψm(0) = 1−
∑
j∈[m−1]
p j(m).
Since there are neither dead nor special links, it follows that
∑
j∈[m−1] p j(m) < 1, so that ψm(0) > 0. Thus,
BF
(
ψm(0),n − 1, φ̂m
)
> BF(0,n − 1, φ̂m)
(
by Lemma 2.1
(
since ψm(0) > 0
))
= φm(1).
On the other hand,
BF
(
ψm (̂x),n − 1, φ̂m
) = BF(0,n − 1, φ̂m) (since ψm (̂x) = 0)
= φm(1)
< φ (1) + x̂ (since x̂> 0).m
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that there is some x0 ∈ (0, x̂) such that
BF
(
ψm(x0),n − 1, φ̂m
)= φm(1) + x0.
We are now ready to determine a fully mixed Nash equilibrium F for the instance 〈n,Φ〉:
– For each user i ∈ [n] and link j ∈ [m], set f (i, j) = ψ j(x0).
It remains to show that F is a fully mixed Nash equilibrium:
– We ﬁrst prove that F is a fully mixed assignment. We need to prove that for each link j ∈ [m], 0< ψ j(x0) < 1.
◦ For a link j ∈ [m − 1], note that 0< x0 < x̂min j∈[m−1] Δφ j Δφ j . Thus, 0< ψ j(x0) < 1, as needed.
◦ For the link m, note that 0< x0 < x̂min j∈[m−1] Δφ j . Thus, ψm(x0) < 1. Since ψm(x) is strictly decreasing in x with
ψm (̂x) = 0, while x0 < x̂, it follows that ψm(x0) > 0. So, 0< ψm(x0) < 1, as needed.
– We ﬁnally prove that F is a Nash equilibrium. Recall that by construction of x0, B(ψm(x0),n − 1, φ̂m) = φm(1) + x0. By
deﬁnition of the value ψ j(x) for each link j ∈ [m− 1], BF(ψ j(x0),n− 1, φ̂ j) = φm(1)+ x0. It follows that BF(ψ j(x0),n−
1, φ̂ j) = φm(1) + x0 for all links j ∈ [m]. Since for each pair of a user i ∈ [n] and a link j ∈ [m],
ICi j(F) = BF(fi j,n − 1, φ̂ j)
= BF(ψ j(x0),n − 1, φ̂ j) (by construction of F)
= φm(1) + x0,
it follows that ICi j(F) is constant over all links j ∈ [m], so that F is a Nash equilibrium.
The proof is now complete. 
By the deﬁnition of dead and special links, it follows that Theorem 4.10 provides an eﬃcient characterization of instances
admitting a fully mixed Nash equilibrium.
We now broaden Theorem 4.3 by proving an upper bound on the Social Cost for the case where the fully mixed Nash
equilibrium does not exist. To state and prove this upper bound, we need ﬁrst to introduce some simple notation. For a
given instance 〈n,Φ〉, denote as SD the set of all special and dead links. Moreover, denote as 〈n,Φ \ SD〉 the restriction of
the instance 〈n,Φ〉 to links outside SD. We prove:
Theorem 4.11. Consider the case of identical users and arbitrary links with non-constant and convex latency functions. Consider an
instance 〈n,Φ〉with an associated Nash equilibrium P, and the instance 〈n,Φ \SD〉with an associated fully mixed Nash equilibrium F.
Then,
SCΣ(n,Φ,P) SCΣ(n,Φ \ SD,F).
Proof. If there are neither dead nor special links, then SCΣ(n,Φ \ SD,F) = SCΣ(n,Φ,F) and the claim follows from
Theorem 4.3. So, assume that there are either dead or special links. Lemma 4.8 implies that no user is assigned (with
non-zero probability) by P to a dead link, while Lemma 4.9 implies that at most one user is assigned (with non-
zero probability) by P to a special link. If no user is assigned (with non-zero probability) by P to a special link, then
SCΣ(n,Φ \ SD,F) = SCΣ(n,Φ,F) and the claim follows again from Theorem 4.3. So, assume that there is a single user
assigned (with non-zero probability) by P to a special link.
Consider any user i ∈ [n]. Note that∑
j∈[m]\S D
θi j(F) =
∑
j∈[m]\S D
∑
k∈[n]\{i}
f (k, j)
=
∑
k∈[n]\{i}
∑
j∈[m]\S D
f (k, j)
=
∑
k∈[n]\{i}
1
= n − 1,
while
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j∈[m]\S D
θi j(P) =
∑
j∈[m]\S D
∑
k∈[n]\{i}
p(k, j)
=
∑
k∈[n]\{i}
∑
j∈[m]\S D
p(k, j)

∑
k∈[n]\{i}
1
= n − 1.
So,
∑
j∈[m]\S D θi j(F) 
∑
j∈[m]\S D θi j(P). It follows that there is some link j0 ∈ [m] \ SD such that θi j0 (F)  θi j0(P), or
f˜ i j0  p˜i j0 Hence, we obtain that
ICi(P)  ICi j0(P) (since P is a Nash equilibrium)
= BF(pi j0 ,n − 1, φ̂ j0 )
 BF(˜pi j0 ,n − 1, φ̂ j0 ) (by Lemma 2.2)
 BF(˜fi j0 ,n − 1, φ̂ j0 )
(
by Lemma 2.1
(
since p˜i j0  f˜ i j(F)
))
= BF(fi j0 ,n − 1, φ̂ j0 ) (by Lemma 4.1)
= ICi j0(F)
(
since j0 ∈ [m] \ SD
)
= ICi(F) (since F is a fully mixed Nash equilibrium).
Since Social Cost is the sum of Expected Individual Costs, the claim now follows. 
5. Price of Anarchy
We now present our bounds on the Price of Anarchy for the case of identical users. The case of identical links with a
monomial latency function is treated in Section 5.1. The more general case of arbitrary links is treated in Section 5.2. We
prepare the reader that Section 5.1 deals with mixed Nash equilibria, while Section 5.2 deals with pure Nash equilibria;
the corresponding bound on the Price of Anarchy in Theorem 5.1 applies to a special case of latency functions (namely,
monomial latency functions), while the bound on the Price of Anarchy in Corollary 5.4 applies to the more general case of
polynomial latency functions. However, it turns out the bound in Corollary 5.4 is smaller than the bound in Theorem 5.1.
5.1. Identical links with a monomial latency function
In this section, we assume that there is some integer d  1 such that the latency function of each link is the monomial
function φ(x) = xd . We prove:
Theorem5.1. Consider the case of identical users and identical links with amonomial latency function φ(x) = xd, for any integer d 1.
Then, PoAΣ < Bd+1 and supm=n→∞ PoAΣ = Bd+1 .
Proof. Since the function φ(x) = xd is strictly increasing and convex, Theorems 4.3, 4.10 and 4.6 imply together that the
worst-case Nash equilibrium is the unique fully mixed Nash equilibrium. Clearly, the standard fully mixed assignment F is
a Nash equilibrium; so, it is the unique fully mixed Nash equilibrium.
We shall proceed as follows. First, we shall derive a formula for the Social Cost of F; then, we shall use this formula to
prove the claim. So,
SCΣ(n,Φ,F) =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
f (i, j)
∑
U⊆[n]\{i}
∏
k∈U
f (k, j)
∏
k/∈U∪{i}
(
1− f (k, j)) · φ̂(|U |)
=
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[m]
∑
B⊆[n]|i∈B
∏
k∈B
f (k, j) ·
∏
k/∈B
(
1− f (k, j)) · φ(|B|)
=
∑
j∈[m]
∑
B⊆[n]
|B| ·
∏
k∈B
f (k, j) ·
∏
k/∈B
(
1− f (k, j)) · φ(|B|)
=
∑
j∈[m]
∑
k∈[n]
∑
B⊆[n]||B|=k
|B| ·
∏
t∈B
f (t, j) ·
∏
t /∈B
(
1− f (t, j)) · φ(|B|)
=
∑ ∑(n
k
)
k
(
1
m
)k
·
(
1− 1
m
)n−k
· kdj∈[m] k∈[n]
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∑
j∈[m]
∑
k∈[n]
(
n
k
)(
1
m
)k
·
(
1− 1
m
)n−k
· kd+1
=m · BF
(
1
m
,n,d + 1
)
=m ·
∑
k∈[d+1]
S(d + 1,k) · nk ·
(
1
m
)k
(by Lemma 2.3)
=
∑
k∈[d+1]
S(d + 1,k) · n
k
mk−1
.
It follows that
SCΣ(n,Φ,F)
OPTΣ(n,Φ)
=
∑
k∈[d+1]
S(d + 1,k) · n
k
mk−1OPTΣ(n,Φ)
.
We proceed by case analysis on the relation between n and m.
(i) Assume ﬁrst that nm. Then, for each index k ∈ [d + 1],
nk
mk−1OPTΣ(n,Φ)
 n
k
mk−1 · n( nm )d
(
since OPTΣ(n,Φ) n
( n
m
)d)
= n
k
nk
·
(
m
n
)d+1−k
< 1
(
since nm and nk < nk
)
,
while also
lim
m=n→∞
nk
mk−1OPTΣ(n,Φ)
= 1.
(ii) Assume now that n <m. Then, for each index k ∈ [d + 1],
nk
mk−1OPTΣ(n,Φ)
 n
k
mk−1n
(
since OPTΣ(n,Φ) = n)
<
nk
nk
(since n <m)
< 1
(
since nk < nk
)
.
It follows that PoAΣ <
∑
k∈[d+1] S(d + 1,k) = Bd+1, while limm=n→∞ PoAΣ = 1, as needed. 
5.2. Arbitrary links
In this section, we consider the case of arbitrary links. We start with a preliminary technical claim.
Proposition 5.2 (Global optimality = local optimality). For any integer n 2, consider the set Xn = {〈x1, . . . , xm〉 ∈ Nm0 |
∑
l∈[m] x j =
n}, and a family of convex functions φl : [n] ∪ {0} → R+0 , where l ∈ [m]. Then, the vector 〈x1, . . . , xm〉 ∈ Xn minimizes the function∑
l∈[m] φl(xl) over Xn if and only if for all pairs of links j,k ∈ [m],
φ j(x j) + φk(xk) φ j(x j + 1) + φk(xk − 1).
It is straightforward to verify that Proposition 5.2 is a particular case of Proposition 3.1. We now prove:
Proposition 5.3. Consider the case of identical users and arbitrary links. Fix an instance 〈n,Φ〉 such that for all links j ∈ [m] and for
all integers k ∈ [n],
kφ j(k) α
∑
t∈[k]
φ j(t).
Then, for any pure Nash equilibrium L,
SCΣ(n,Φ,L) α · OPTΣ(n,Φ).
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function
ψ j(k) =
∑
t∈[k]
φ j(t).
We ﬁrst show that for each link j ∈ [m], the function ψ j is convex. Fix a link j ∈ [m] and an integer k ∈ [n − 1]. Clearly,
ψ j(k + 1) − ψ j(k) = φ j(k + 1) and ψ j(k) − ψ j(k − 1) = φ j(k). Since the function φ j is non-decreasing, it follows that
ψ j(k + 1) − ψ j(k)ψ j(k) − ψ j(k − 1), so that ψ j is convex.
We now show that the vector 〈δ1(L), . . . , δm(L)〉 minimizes the function ∑ j∈[m] ψ j(x j) under the restriction that∑
j∈[m] x j = n. By deﬁnition of Nash equilibrium, we have that φ j(δ j(L) + 1)  φk(δk(L)) for all pairs of links j,k ∈ [m].
Hence,
ψ j
(
δ j(L) + 1
)+ ψk(δk(L) − 1)
= ψ j
(
δ j(L)
)+ φ j(δ j(L) + 1)+ ψk(δk(L))− φk(δk(L)) (by deﬁnition of ψ j(x) and ψk(x))
ψ j
(
δ j(L)
)+ ψk(δk(L)) (since φ j(δ j(L) + 1) φk(δk(L))).
By Proposition 5.2, this implies that the pure assignment L induces loads δ1(L), . . . , δm(L) which minimize the function∑
j∈[m] ψ j(δ j(L)) under the restriction that
∑
l∈[m] xl = n; call L a minimizing assignment. Thus,
SCΣ(n,Φ,L) =
∑
j∈[m]
δ j(L)φ j
(
δ j(L)
)

∑
j∈[m]
α ·
∑
t∈[δ j(L)]
φ j(t) (by assumption on φ)
= α
∑
j∈[m]
ψ j
(
δ j(L)
)
(by deﬁnition of ψ j)
 α
∑
j∈[m]
ψ j
(
δ j(G)
)
(since L is a minimizing assignment)
= α
∑
j∈[m]
∑
t∈[δ j(G)]
φ j(t) (by deﬁnition of ψ j)
 α
∑
j∈[m]
δ j(G)φ j
(
δ j(G)
)
(since φ j is non-decreasing)
= α · OPTΣ(n,Φ), (since G is an optimum assignment),
as needed. 
We remark that the proof of Proposition 5.3 is a straightforward adaptation of the corresponding proof for [44, Corol-
lary 2.10] from the continuous setting with splittable ﬂows and continuous latency functions to the discrete setting with
unsplittable traﬃcs and discrete latency functions. We conclude this section with a simple application of Proposition 5.3.
Corollary 5.4. Consider the case of identical users. Assume that all latency functions are (non-zero) polynomials with non-negative
coeﬃcients and maximum degree d. Then, for pure Nash equilibria,
PoAΣ  d + 1.
Proof. Consider any latency function φ(x) =∑dk=0 akxk with ak  0 for all indices k ∈ [d] ∪ {0}. By Proposition 5.3, it suﬃces
to prove that
xφ(x)∑
t∈[x] φ(t)
 d + 1
for all integers x ∈ [n]. Clearly,
xφ(x)∑
t∈[x] φ(t)
=
∑d
k=0 akxk+1∑d
k=0 ak(
∑
t∈[x] tk)
.
We shall use the following simple inductive claim:
Lemma 5.5. For all integers k 0 and x 1,
∑
t∈[x] tk  x
k+1
.k+1
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Input: an instance 〈w,Φ〉, and an (arbitrary) pure assignment L
Output: a Nash equilibrium L′
(1) begin
(2) L′ ← L:
(2a) for j = 1, . . . ,m do
(2b) δ j(L′) ← δ j(L);
(3) for δ = n,  n2 ,  n4 , . . . ,1 do
(4) while ∃s, t ∈ [m] with δs(L′) δ and φs(δs(L′)) > φt (δt (L′) + δ) do
(5) choose such t ∈ [m] so that φt (δt (L′) + δ) is minimum;
(6) choose such s ∈ [m] so that φs(δs(L′)) is maximum;
(7) transfer δ users from s to t:
(7a) δs(L′) ← δs(L′) − δ;
(7b) δt (L′) ← δt (L′) + δ;
(8) return L′;
(9) end
Fig. 1. Algorithm ComputeNash.
So, by Lemma 5.5,
xφ(x)∑
t∈[x] φ(t)

∑d
k=0 akxk+1∑d
k=0
akxk+1
k+1
 d + 1,
as needed. 
We remark that Corollary 5.4 is a discrete analog of [44, Corollary 2.11], which held for splittable ﬂows and continuous
latency functions.
6. Computing pure Nash equilibria and optimal assignments
In this section, we provide a fast algorithm to compute a pure Nash equilibrium for the case of identical users and
arbitrary links. This algorithm is presented and analyzed in Section 6.1. Section 6.2 establishes that this algorithm can also
be used to compute an optimum (pure) assignment for the same case.
6.1. Pure Nash equilibria
A simple approach to compute a pure Nash equilibrium is to assign the (identical) users one-by-one to their respective
best links. This approach is motivated by the classical LPT scheduling algorithm due to Graham [27]; the algorithm had
been already employed by Fotakis et al. [18, Section 3] for the case of the KP model (where latency functions are linear).
The resulting greedy algorithm can be implemented to run in time O ((n +m) logm) if the link latencies are maintained in
a priority queue, which is updated after the assignment of each user.
We present an algorithm ComputeNash to compute a pure Nash equilibrium under the assumption of arbitrary, non-
decreasing latency functions. We shall establish that the running time of ComputeNash is O (m logn logm); this improves
on the naive approach if m = o( nlogn ).
We start with an informal description of the algorithm ComputeNash. A pseudocode description of the algorithm Com-
puteNash appears in Fig. 1. The algorithm takes as input an arbitrary initial pure assignment L and gives as output a pure
Nash equilibrium L′ . It does so by moving chunks of users at a time. The ﬁrst chunk contains all users. In each phase, the
chunk size is halved until a chunk contains one user only, in which case a Nash equilibrium has been reached. All users in a
moved chunk improve their Individual Costs.
We prove:
Theorem 6.1. Consider the case of identical users and arbitrary links. Then, ComputeNash computes a pure Nash equilibrium in
O (m logm logn) time.
Proof. After the last iteration of the algorithm ComputeNash (with δ = 1), it holds that φs(δs(L′))  φt(δt(L′) + 1) for all
pairs of links s, t ∈ [m]. This implies that L′ is a (pure) Nash equilibrium. We continue to analyze the running time of the
algorithm ComputeNash. To do so, we ﬁrst prove an invariant of the algorithm.
Lemma 6.2 (Only increases or only decreases). During each iteration of the for loop, the load on a link is either increased or decreased
but not both.
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possible.
(i) The load on some link t ∈ [m] is decreased after it has been increased.
Consider an increase to the load on link t and the earliest decrease to the load on link t following the increase. By the
algorithm, there is some link u whose load is increased simultaneously with the decrease to the load on link t . Denote
δt and δu , and δ̂t and δ̂u the loads on links t and u before the increase (to the load on link t) and before the decrease
(to the load on link t), respectively. Note that δ̂t = δt + δ.
For the increase to the load on link t , the choice of t by the algorithm implies that φt(δt + δ)  φu(δu + δ). For the
decrease to the load on link t , the algorithm implies that φt (̂δt) > φu (̂δu + δ) or φt(δt + δ) > φu (̂δu + δ). It follows that
φu(δu + δ) > φu (̂δu + δ). Since φu is non-decreasing, it follows that δ̂u < δu . Hence, there is a decrease to the load on
link u in between the increase to the load on link t and the increase to the load on link u. Take the latest such decrease
to the load on link u. By the algorithm, the load on link u before this decrease is δ̂u + δ. Since there is no change to the
load on link t since it has been increased, the load on link t before this decrease is still δt + δ. The choice of u by the
algorithm for this decrease (to the load on link u) implies that φu (̂δu + δ) φt(δt + δ). A contradiction.
(ii) The load on some link s ∈ [m] is increased after it has been decreased.
Consider a decrease to the load on link s and the earliest increase to the load on link s following the decrease. By the
algorithm, there is some link u whose load is decreased simultaneously with the increase to the load on link s. Denote
δs and δu , and δ̂s and δ̂u the loads on links s and u before the decrease (to the load on link s) and before the increase
(to the load on link s), respectively. Note that δ̂s = δs − δ.
For the decrease to the load on link s, the choice of s by the algorithm implies that φs(δs)  φu(δu). For the increase
to the load on link s, the algorithm implies that φs (̂δs + δ) < φu (̂δu) or φs(δs) < φu (̂δu). It follows that φu(δu) < φu (̂δu).
Since φu is non-decreasing, it follows that δu < δ̂u . Hence, there is an increase to the load on link u in between the
decrease to the load on link s and the decrease to the load on link u. Take the latest such increase to the load on link u.
By the algorithm, the load on link u before this increase is δ̂u − δ. Since there is no change to the load on link s since
it has been decreased, the load on link s before this increase is still δs − δ. The choice of u by the algorithm for this
increase (to the load on link u) implies that φu((̂δu − δ) + δ) φs((δs − δ) + δ) or φu (̂δu) φs(δs). A contradiction.
Since we derived a contradiction in all possible cases, the proof is now complete. 
We continue to prove:
Lemma 6.3. In each iteration of the for loop, there are at most O (m) iterations of thewhile loop.
Proof. We consider separately the ﬁrst iteration of the for loop, where δ = n. Consider the ﬁrst (if any) corresponding
iteration of the while loop, where the load on some link s is decreased and the load on some link t is increased. For any
link l, denote δl and δ̂l the loads on link l before and after this iteration of the while loop, respectively. By the algorithm,
δs  n; it follows that δl = 0 for any link l = s. By the algorithm, δ̂t = δt + n = n: it follows that δ̂l = 0 for any link l = t .
By the algorithm, φs(δs) > φt(δt + n), or φs(n) > φt(n). By the choice of link t by the algorithm, it holds that for any
link t′ such that φs(δs) > φt′ (δt′ + n) or φs(n) > φt′(n), either φt(δt + n) φt′ (δt′ + n) or φt(n) φt′(n).
Assume, by way of contradiction, that a second iteration of the while loop is now possible. Since δ̂t = n and δ̂t′ = 0 for
any link t′ = t , it follows by the algorithm that there is some link t′ = t such that φt(n) > φt′ (n). Recall also that φs(n) >
φt(n). It follows that φt′ (n) < φs(n). Thus, there is a link t′ such that φt′ (n) < φs(n) for which φt(n) > φt′ (n). A contradiction.
It follows that there is at most one iteration of the while loop in the ﬁrst iteration of the for loop.
Consider now any subsequent iteration of the for loop with chunk size δ < n. The immediately preceding iteration of the
for loop has parameter δ′ such that δ =  δ′2 ; clearly, δ′  2δ. Denote as δ˜ j the load on link j ∈ [m] upon completion of that
iteration of the for loop (and immediately before the current iteration with chunk size δ). Partition the set of links [m] into
the two sets
L1 =
{
j ∈ [m] ∣∣ δ˜ j < 2δ}
and
L2 =
{
j ∈ [m] ∣∣ δ˜ j  2δ}.
Since each iteration of the while loop incurs a simultaneous increase and decrease to the loads on two distinct links, the
number of iterations of the while loop (in the considered iteration of the for loop) is equal to the total number of decreases
to link loads (in the considered iteration of the for loop). Hence, we proceed to show:
(1) The total number of decreases (in the considered iteration of the for loop) to loads of links in the set L1 is at most m.
(2) The total number of decreases (in the considered iteration of the for loop) to loads of links in the set L2 is at most m.
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Since the initial load on link j is less than 2δ and each decrease decreases the load by δ, it follows that the load on link j
can be decreased at most once. Hence, the total number of decreases to loads of links in L1 is at most m.
Proof of (2): We will establish that each link can increase simultaneously with a decrease to the load of any link in L2
at most once. This will imply that the number of decreases to loads of links in the set L2 is at most m.
Consider any link t ∈ [m] and any two consecutive increases to its load. (If there is at most one increase to the load on
link t , the claim about the increases to the load on link t holds trivially.) By the algorithm, there is some link s whose load
is decreased simultaneously with the second increase to the load on link t . Denote by δs and δt , and δ̂s and δ̂t the loads
on links s and t before the ﬁrst increase (to the load on link t) and before the second increase (to the load on link t),
respectively. Note that δ̂t = δt + δ.
– By Lemma 6.2, there can be no increase to the load on link s in the current iteration of the for loop. Hence, δ̂s  δs  δ˜s .
– By Lemma 6.2, there can be no decrease to the load on link t in the current iteration of the for loop. Hence, δ̂t > δt  δ˜t .
For the second increase to the load on link t , the algorithm implies that φs (̂δs) > φt (̂δt + δ). Since δ̂t = δt + δ, it follows
that φs (̂δs) > φt(δt + 2δ).
By the post-condition for the previous iteration of the for loop, either φs (˜δs)  φt (˜δt + δ′) or δ˜s < δ′ . We proceed to
establish the necessity of the second possibility.
We ﬁrst prove that δ˜s < δ′ . Assume, by way of contradiction, that δ˜s  δ′ . This implies that φs (˜δs)  φt (˜δ + δ′). Since
δs  δ˜s and δ˜t  δt , and both φs and φt are non-decreasing, it follows that φs(δs)  φt(δt + δ′). Since δ′  2δ and φt is
non-decreasing, φt(δt + δ′)  φt(δt + 2δ). It follows that φs(δs)  φt(δt + 2δ). Since φs (̂δs) > φt(δt + 2δ), it follows that
φs(δs) < φs (̂δs). Since φs is non-decreasing, this implies that δs < δ̂s . A contradiction. It follows that δ˜s < δ′ .
Since δ′  2δ, this implies that δ˜s < 2δ. By deﬁnition of the set L1, it follows that s ∈ L1. This implies that an increase
to the load on a link can occur simultaneously with a decrease to the load of any link in the set L2 only if this is the ﬁrst
such increase. So, the load on a link can increase simultaneously with a decrease to the load of any link in the set L2 at
most once. It follows that the number of decreases to loads of links in the set L2 is at most m, as needed.
Claims (1) and (2) imply together that the number of iterations of the while loop in each iteration of the for loop
is O (m), as needed. 
Each iteration of the for loop (with chunk size δ) is implemented using two priority queues. In the ﬁrst queue, the
priorities are according to φ j(δ j(L′)), j ∈ [m]; in the second queue, the priorities are according to φ j(δ j(L′) + δ), j ∈ [m]. At
the beginning of the iteration, the two priority queues are constructed in time O (m logm).
In each iteration of the while loop, the links s and t (with maximum φs(δs(L′)) and minimum φt(δt(L′)+ δ), respectively)
are determined in constant time using the two priority queues. After each iteration of the while loop, which updates
φs(δs(L′)) and φt(δt(L′)), the two priority queues are updated in time O (logm) (by two successive deletion and insertion
operations).
By Lemma 6.3, the total time for each iteration of the for loop is O (m logm)+ O (m) · O (logm) = O (m logm). Since there
are logn iterations of the for loop, the total running time of ComputeNash is O (m logm logn), as needed. 
6.2. Optimal pure assignments
We now establish a relation between optimum pure assignments for a given vector of latency functions and pure Nash
equilibria for a modiﬁed vector of latency functions. More speciﬁcally, given a vector Φ of latency functions, construct the
vector Ψ of latency functions by deﬁning for each link l ∈ [m], the latency function ψl : [n] → R as
ψl(x) = xφl(x) − (x− 1)φl(x− 1)
for each x ∈ [n]. We prove:
Proposition 6.4. Consider the case of identical users. Assume that for each link l ∈ [m], the function xφl(x) is convex. Then, a pure
assignment L is optimum for the instance 〈n,Φ〉 if and only if L is a Nash equilibrium for the instance 〈n,Ψ 〉.
Proof. Clearly, L is a Nash equilibrium for the instance 〈n,Ψ 〉 if and only if for all pairs of links j,k ∈ [m],
ψ j
(
δ j(L)
)
ψk
(
δk(L) + 1
);
or, by the deﬁnition of the latency function vector Ψ ,
δ j(L)φ j
(
δ j(L)
)− (δ j(L) − 1)φ j(δ j(L) − 1)

(
δk(L) + 1
)
φk
(
δk(L) + 1
)− δk(L)φk(δk(L))
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δ j(L)φ j
(
δ j(L)
)+ δk(L)φk(δk(L))

(
δ j(L) − 1
)
φ j
(
δ j(L) − 1
)+ (δk(L) + 1)φk(δk(L) + 1).
By Proposition 5.2, these are necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the minimization of the sum∑
j∈[m] δ j(L)φ j(δ j(L)) over pure assignments L. Since SCΣ(w,Φ,L) =
∑
j∈[m] δ j(L)φ j(δ j(L)), these are as well necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for L to be an optimum pure assignment for the instance 〈n,Φ〉. The proof is now complete. 
We remark that Proposition 6.4 transfers [44, Corollary 2.7] from the continuous setting of the Wardrop model to discrete
routing games. Proposition 6.4 immediately implies:
Corollary 6.5. Consider the case of identical users. Assume that for each link l ∈ [m], the function xφl(x) is convex. Then, an optimum
pure assignment can be computed in time O (m logm logn).
7. Computing best and worst pure Nash equilibria
In this section, we present some complexity results for the computation of best and worst pure Nash equilibria. More
speciﬁcally, we will consider the following two decision problems, which are natural decision versions of corresponding
optimization problems deﬁned in [18] for the KP model:
BEST PURE NE
Instance: An instance 〈w,Φ〉 and a rational number B > 0.
Question: Is there a pure Nash equilibrium L with SCΣ(w,Φ,L) B?
WORST PURE NE
Instance: An instance 〈w,Φ〉 and a rational number B > 0.
Question: Is there a pure Nash equilibrium L with SCΣ(w,Φ,L) B?
We will prove that both these problems are N P-complete even for the case of identical links with an identity latency
function. The proofs will use polynomial time transformations from the original N P-complete PARTITION problem [29] or
its slight variant RESTRICTED PARTITION that we deﬁne below.
PARTITION
Instance: A ﬁnite set A of items with |A| 2, and a size s(a) ∈ N for each item a ∈ A.
Question: Is there a subset A′ ⊆ A such that ∑a∈A′ s(a) =∑a∈A\A′ s(a)?
RESTRICTED PARTITION
Instance: A ﬁnite set A of items with |A|  12, and a size s(a) ∈ N for each item a ∈ A such that s(a) 
1
8
∑
a′∈A s(a′).
Question: Is there a subset A′ ⊆ A such that ∑a∈A′ s(a) =∑a∈A\A′ s(a)?
Clearly, PARTITION reduces trivially to RESTRICTED PARTITION by padding the ﬁnite set A in the instance of PARTITION
with ten new items a′ with s(a′) =∑a∈A s(a). It is easy to see that this trivial reduction is parsimonious; since #PARTITION
(i.e. the counting version of PARTITION) is #P-complete [45], it follows that #RESTRICTED PARTITION (i.e. the counting
version of RESTRICTED PARTITION) is also #P-complete.
We shall also consider the counting versions #BEST PURE NE and #WORST PURE NE of BEST PURE NE and WORST
PURE NE, respectively.
We start by proving:
Theorem 7.1. Consider the case of identical links. Then, BEST PURE NE is N P-complete.
Proof. Clearly, BEST PURE NE ∈ N P . To prove N P-hardness, we employ a polynomial time transformation from RE-
STRICTED PARTITION to BEST PURE NE. Given an instance of RESTRICTED PARTITION, we construct an instance
〈w, 〈m, φ〉〉 of BEST PURE NE as follows:
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wi =
{
s(ai), 1 i  |A|,∑
a∈A s(a)
2 , i ∈ {|A| + 1, |A| + 2}.
– There are three identical links with identity latency function φ(x) = x.
– B = ( |A|2 + 2)
∑
a∈A s(a).
Clearly, this is a polynomial time mapping. We prove that it is a transformation from RESTRICTED PARTITION to BEST
PURE NE.
Assume ﬁrst that the instance of RESTRICTED PARTITION is positive, and consider a subset A′ ⊆ A such that∑
a∈A′ s(a) =
∑
a∈A\A′ s(a). Use A′ to deﬁne a pure assignment L for the constructed instance of BEST PURE NE as fol-
lows:
– For each item ai ∈ A′ , user i is assigned to link 1; for each item ai ∈ A \ A′ , user i is assigned to link 2.
– Users |A| + 1 and |A| + 2 are assigned to link 3.
We now prove that L is a (pure) Nash equilibrium for the instance 〈w, 〈m, φ〉〉 of BEST PURE NE with SC(w, 〈m, φ〉,L)B .
Clearly,
δ1(L) =
∑
ai∈A′
wi (by deﬁnition of L)
=
∑
ai∈A′
s(ai) (by the mapping)
=
∑
a∈A s(a)
2
,
and similarly δ2(L) =
∑
a∈A s(a)
2 . On the other hand,
δ3(L) =
∑
i∈{|A|+1,|A|+2}
wi (by the deﬁnition of L)
=
∑
i∈{|A|+1,|A|+2}
∑
a∈A s(a)
2
(by the mapping)
=
∑
a∈A
s(a).
Note that each user i ∈ [|A|] is assigned to either link 1 or link 2; thus, ICi(L) = δ1(L) = δ2(L). So, user i is satisﬁed
in L. Note also that IC|A|+1(L) = δ3(L) = δ1(L) + w |A|+1 = δ2(L) + w |A|+1 and similarly IC|A|+2(L) = δ3(L) = δ1(L) + w |A|+2 =
δ2(L) + w |A|+2; so users |A| + 1 and |A| + 2 are also satisﬁed in L, and L is a Nash equilibrium. Clearly,
SCΣ
(
w, 〈m, φ〉,L)= |A| · δ1(L) + 2 · δ3(L)
= |A| ·
∑
a∈A s(a)
2
+ 2 ·
∑
a∈A
s(a)
=
( |A|
2
+ 2
)
·
∑
a∈A
s(a)
= B.
So, the instance 〈w, 〈m, φ〉〉 of BEST PURE NE is also positive.
Assume now that the instance of RESTRICTED PARTITION is negative. So, for every subset A′ ⊆ A, ∑a∈A′ s(a) =∑
a∈A\A′ s(a). It follows that for every subset A′ ⊆ A, either
∑
a∈A′ s(a) <
∑
a∈A s(a)
2 or
∑
a∈A\A′ s(a) <
∑
a∈A s(a)
2 (but not both).
We now prove that the instance 〈w, 〈m, φ〉〉 of BEST PURE NE is also negative. Consider any arbitrary (pure) Nash
equilibrium L for the instance 〈w, 〈m, φ〉〉. We will prove that SCΣ(w, 〈m, φ〉,L) > B . We ﬁrst show a preliminary property
of L.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that users |A| + 1 and |A| + 2 were assigned to the same link in L. Say that link were
link 3. Then, IC|A|+1(L)  w |A|+1 + w |A|+2 = ∑a∈A s(a). Denote as A′ the set of users assigned to link 1; then, δ1(L) =∑
a∈A′ s(a). Assume, without loss of generality, that
∑
a∈A′ s(a) <
∑
a∈A s(a) . Then,2
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∑
a∈A′
s(a) + w |A|+1
=
∑
a∈A′
s(a) +
∑
a∈A s(a)
2
(by the mapping)
<
∑
a∈A s(a)
2
+
∑
a∈A s(a)
2
(by assumption)
=
∑
a∈A
s(a)
 IC|A|+1(L),
so that user |A| + 1 is not satisﬁed in L; this contradicts the fact that L is a Nash equilibrium. It follows that users |A| + 1
and |A| + 2 are assigned to different links in L.
Assume, without loss of generality, that δ1(L) δ2(L) δ3(L). Clearly,
δ1(L) + δ2(L) + δ3(L) =
∑
i∈[n]
wi = 2
∑
a∈A
s(a),
which implies that
δ1(L)
2
3
∑
a∈A
s(a).
Now, since w |A|+1 = w |A|+2 =
∑
a∈A s(a)
2 and users |A| + 1 and |A| + 2 are assigned to different links, it follows that there is
a user i ∈ [|A|] assigned to link 1; by deﬁnition of RESTRICTED PARTITION, it follows that wi  18
∑
a∈A s(a). Since L is a
Nash equilibrium, user i is satisﬁed in L, so that
ICi(L) = δ1(L)
 δ3(L) + wi
 δ3(L) + 1
8
∑
a∈A
s(a).
Hence,
δ3(L)  δ1(L) − 1
8
∑
a∈A
s(a)
=
(
2− 1
8
)∑
a∈A
s(a) − δ2(L) − δ3(L)
(
since δ1(L) + δ2(L) + δ3(L) = 2∑a∈A s(a))
 15
8
∑
a∈A
s(a) − δ1(L) − δ3(L)
(
since δ1(L) δ2(L)
)
 15
8
∑
a∈A
s(a) − δ3(L) − 1
8
∑
a∈A
s(a) − δ3(L)
(
since δ1(L) δ3(L) + 18
∑
a∈A s(a)
)
,
which implies that
δ3(L)
7
12
∑
a∈A
s(a).
Since there are |A| + 2 users and δ1(L) δ2(L) δ3(L), it follows from the deﬁnition of Social Cost that
SCΣ
(
w, 〈m, φ〉,L) (|A| + 2) · δ3(L)

(|A| + 2) · 7
12
∑
a∈A
s(a)
>
( |A|
2
+ 2
)
·
∑
a∈A
s(a)
(
since |A| 12)
= B.
So, the instance 〈w, 〈m, φ〉〉 is also negative. This completes the proof. 
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#RESTRICTED PARTITION is #P-complete, it immediately follows:
Corollary 7.2. Consider the case of identical links. Then #BEST PURE NE is #P-complete.
We continue to prove:
Theorem 7.3. Consider the case of identical links. Then, WORST PURE NE is N P-complete.
Proof. Clearly, WORST PURE NE ∈ N P . To prove N P-hardness, we employ a polynomial time transformation from PARTI-
TION to WORST PURE NE. Given an instance of PARTITION, we construct an instance 〈w, 〈m, φ〉〉 of WORST PURE NE as
follows:
– There are 3|A| users with
wi =
{
s(ai), i ∈ [|A|],
1
4|A| , |A| + 1 i  3|A|.
– There are two identical links with identity latency function φ(x) = x.
– B = 3|A|(
∑
a∈A s(a)
2 + 14 ).
Clearly, this is a polynomial time mapping. We prove that it is a transformation from PARTITION to WORST PURE NE.
Assume ﬁrst that the instance of PARTITION is positive, and consider a subset A′ ⊆ A such that ∑a∈A′ s(a) =∑
a∈A\A′ s(a). Use A′ to deﬁne a pure assignment L for the constructed instance 〈w, 〈m, φ〉〉 of WORST PURE NE as fol-
lows:
– For each item ai ∈ A′ , user i is assigned to link 1; for each item ai ∈ A \ A′ , user i is assigned to link 2.
– Each user i with |A| + 1 i  2|A| is assigned to link 1; each user i with 2|A| + 1 i  3|A| is assigned to link 2.
We now prove that L is a Nash equilibrium for the instance 〈w, 〈m, φ〉〉 of WORST PURE NE with SCΣ(w, 〈m, φ〉,L)  B .
Clearly,
δ1(L) =
∑
a∈A′
s(a) +
∑
|A|+1i2|A|
1
4|A| (by deﬁnition of L and the mapping)
=
∑
a∈A′
s(a) + 1
4
=
∑
a∈A s(a)
2
+ 1
4
(by choice of A′) ,
and similarly
δ2(L) =
∑
a∈A s(a)
2
+ 1
4
.
Since δ1(L) = δ2(L), all users are satisﬁed in L, and L is a Nash equilibrium. Since 3|A| users are assigned to links and
δ1(L) = δ2(L), it follows that
SCΣ
(
w, 〈m, φ〉,L)= 3|A| · δ1(L)
= 3|A| ·
(∑
a∈A s(a)
2
+ 1
4
)
= B.
So, the instance 〈w, 〈m, φ〉〉 of WORST PURE NE is also positive.
Assume now that the instance of PARTITION is negative. So, for every subset A′ ⊆ A, ∑a∈A′ s(a) =∑a∈A\A′ s(a). It follows
that for every subset A′ ⊆ A, either ∑a∈A′ s(a) < ∑a∈A s(a)2 or ∑a∈A\A′ s(a) < ∑a∈A s(a)2 (but not both).
We now prove that the instance 〈w, 〈m, φ〉〉 of WORST PURE NE is also negative. Consider any arbitrary pure Nash
equilibrium L for the instance 〈w, 〈m, φ〉〉. We will prove that SCΣ(w, 〈m, φ〉,L) < B .
Denote as A′ the set of users assigned to link 1. So, A \ A′ is the set of users assigned to link 2. Assume, without loss of
generality, that
∑
a∈A′ s(a) <
∑
a∈A s(a)
2 . Then,
∑
a∈A\A′ s(a) >
∑
a∈A s(a)
2 , so that
∑
a∈A\A′ s(a)−
∑
a∈A′ s(a) 1. We ﬁrst show a
preliminary property of L.
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ICi(L) = δ2(L)

∑
a∈A\A′
s(a)+ wi

∑
a∈A′
s(a) + 1+ wi
>
∑
a∈A′
s(a) +
∑
|A|+1k3|A|
s(a) + wi
(
since
∑
|A|+1k3|A| s(a) = 12
)
 δ1(L) + wi
= ICi1(L),
which implies that user i is not satisﬁed in L; this contradicts the fact that L is a Nash equilibrium. It follows that all users i
with |A| + 1 i  3|A| are assigned to link 1 in L, so that
δ1(L) =
∑
a∈A′
s(a)+ 2|A| 1
4|A| (by the mapping)
=
∑
a∈A′
s(a)+ 1
2
.
For each link j ∈ [2], denote as n j the number of users i with ai ∈ A that are assigned to link j in L. Clearly, ∑ j∈[2] n j = |A|.
So, it follows from the deﬁnition of Social Cost that
SC
(
w, 〈m, φ〉,L)
= (n1 + 2|A|)δ1(L) + n2δ2(L)
= (n1 + 2|A|)(∑
a∈A′
s(a) + 1
2
)
+ n2
( ∑
a∈A\A′
s(a)
)
< 2|A|
(∑
a∈A′
s(a)+ 1
2
)
+ (n1 + n2)
( ∑
a∈A\A′
s(a)
) (
since
∑
a∈A′ s(a) + 12 <
∑
a∈A\A′ s(a)
)
= 2|A|
(∑
a∈A′
s(a)+ 1
2
)
+ |A|
( ∑
a∈A\A′
s(a)
)
= |A|
(∑
a∈A′
s(a) +
∑
a∈A\A′
s(a)
)
+ |A|
∑
a∈A′
s(a)+ |A|
= |A|
∑
a∈A
s(a) + |A|
∑
a∈A′
s(a)+ |A|
 |A|
∑
a∈A
s(a) + |A|
(∑
a∈A s(a)
2
− 1
2
)
+ |A| (since ∑a∈A′ s(a) ∑a∈A s(a)2 − 12 )
= 3|A|
(∑
a∈A s(a)
2
+ 1
6
)
< B.
So, the instance 〈w, 〈m, φ〉〉 of WORST PURE NE is also negative. This completes the proof. 
Note that the reduction from PARTITION employed in the proof of Theorem 7.3 is parsimonious; since #PARTITION is
#P-complete [45], it immediately follows:
Corollary 7.4. Consider the case of identical links. Then #WORST PURE NE is #P-complete.
8. Epilogue
We have introduced discrete routing games combining features from two of the most prominent models for non-
cooperative routing, namely the KP model [31] and the Wardrop model [48].
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that, for the case of identical users, the Social Cost of any Nash equilibrium is bounded by the Social Cost of the fully
mixed Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we derived a characterization of instances admitting a fully mixed Nash equilibrium,
and we proved that a fully mixed Nash equilibrium may exist only uniquely.
– We presented upper bounds on the Price of Anarchy for the case of identical users.
– Still for the case of identical users, we showed that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed eﬃciently. For the case of
arbitrary users, we proved that computing the best or the worst pure Nash equilibrium is already N P-complete even
for identical links with an identity latency function.
We conclude with a collection of interesting open problems about discrete routing games.
(i) Extend the results about uniqueness and existence of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium (namely, Theorems 4.6 and 4.10)
from the case of identical users to the case of arbitrary users. In particular, what are the analogs of dead links and
special links for such extension?
(ii) Prove or disprove the FMNE Conjecture for discrete routing games.
(iii) Obtain bounds on the Price of Anarchy for the case of arbitrary users and identical links with a monomial latency
function. (This will extend Theorem 5.1.)
(iv) Obtain bounds on the Price of Anarchy for the case of arbitrary users and arbitrary links with a polynomial latency
function. (This will extend Corollary 5.4.)
(v) Is the fast algorithm we presented in Section 6 to compute a pure Nash equilibrium (for the case of identical users and
arbitrary links) optimal? We note that there are no known lower bounds for this problem.
(vi) Is there a PTAS for either BEST PURE NE or WORST PURE NE? We know that there is a PTAS to compute a best pure
Nash equilibrium for the KP model [14]. (This PTAS employs known approximation algorithms to compute an optimum
pure assignment [28]; the so called Nashiﬁcation technique is then applied on that to transform it in polynomial time
into a pure Nash equilibrium with no increased Social Cost.)
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